Buddhist No-Self and Moral Responsibility

Chadha explains that the Buddhist denial of self is not merely a rejection of a metaphysical soul substance like the Cartesian soul or Hindu Atman. Vasubandhu's argument also targets our intuitive notion of a self as the agent behind action, the subject of experience, and the bearer of responsibility.

Chadha compares the Buddhist view to Parfit's, saying both allow us to talk as if there are agents and subjects of experience while denying this reflects any underlying metaphysical fact. A person is a shorthand expression for an ever-changing psychophysical aggregate rather than a real enduring entity.

Chadha argues that belief in an enduring self generates self-interest and anxiety about one's future, which is a major source of suffering. She ties this to the Buddha's Four Noble Truths and notes his second sermon specifically addressed the no-self view.

Using the example of being tempted to steal a mango, Chadha shows how sensory impression, memory, intention, and deliberation can explain action without needing a self behind the process. Vasubandhu's point is that the self does no explanatory work, so there is no reason to posit one.

Responding to a Hindu objection that karma requires an enduring self, Vasubandhu argues that responsibility can be explained by how a continuum of mental and physical states transforms over time, such as anxiety arising before wrongdoing and regret arising after it.

Warburton challenges whether this account collapses into mere causal history indistinguishable from being buffeted by outside forces, using Wittgenstein's image of paper blown in the wind. Chadha replies that Buddhists treat humans as rational beings capable of deliberation, and that self-interested reasoning, not the causal nexus itself, produces wrong choices.

Chadha closes by urging philosophers not to dismiss the no-self view simply because it seems to threaten morality. She argues for exploring what an impersonal morality would actually look like and points to existing Buddhist practices and communities as evidence that responsibility can be handled without a self.

Warburton presses that explaining responsibility through a continuum of cause and effect sounds like being subject to external forces rather than real agency, comparing it to Wittgenstein's image of blown paper commenting on its own movement. Chadha rejects this, insisting Buddhists hold that humans are rational beings capable of deliberation and right choice, not passive objects.

Warburton suggests that biological continuity and separateness from other bodies gives a reasonable basis for thinking of oneself as a distinct self pursuing survival. Chadha replies that being a psychophysical organism at a particular place and time is sufficient for individuation, so no additional self behind the organism is needed.