Question
How should a Stoic respond to political division and upsetting news?
A look at what Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius actually say about anger, blame, and the people we disagree with.
Updated
The short answer
A Stoic response starts by locating the disturbance correctly: it is never the news or the opponent that upsets you, it is the judgment you form about them. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius both hold that people who act badly, politically or otherwise, act from ignorance of what is actually good, not from simple malice. That does not mean withdrawing from politics. It means acting on what is up to you, your own judgments and choices, without handing your peace of mind to people and events you cannot control.
Key points
- Epictetus holds that disturbance comes from our own judgments about events, not from the events themselves.
- Marcus Aurelius prepares each morning to meet difficult people and attributes their behavior to ignorance of good and evil, not malice.
- Marcus gives a step by step sequence in Meditations 11.18 for defusing anger at people who offend you.
- The dichotomy of control separates your own actions, such as voting or arguing a position, from outcomes and other people's opinions, which are not up to you.
- None of this counsels indifference to political events, only clarity about where the real disturbance originates.
The longer answer
The upsetting part of political news is never the event itself. It is the judgment you form about it. Epictetus states this as a general law of the mind: "Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things" (Handbook 5). A headline, a vote, a policy, an opponent's tweet: none of these things can enter your mind and disturb you directly. What disturbs you is the verdict you attach to it, the thought that this should not be happening, that these people are simply bad, that the world is falling apart.
This is easy to misread as a claim that political events do not matter, or that you should not care. That is not the argument. Epictetus is not telling you the news is fine. He is telling you where the disturbance actually comes from, so that you stop mistaking your own reaction for the world's fault. He sorts people into three stages on this point. The uninstructed person blames others for his bad condition. The person just starting philosophy blames himself. The one who is fully instructed blames neither others nor himself (Handbook 5). The goal is not self-blame in place of other-blame. It is seeing clearly enough that blame, of either kind, stops being the reflex.
Marcus Aurelius takes this directly into the territory of people you find infuriating. He opens Meditations 2 by telling himself what to expect from the day: he will meet the busy-body, the ungrateful, the arrogant, the deceitful, the envious, the unsocial (Meditations 2.1). This is not cynicism. It is preparation, the same way an athlete expects resistance before stepping onto the field. And his diagnosis of why people act this way is specific: it happens through their ignorance of what is good and evil (Meditations 2.1). Someone who has the wrong idea about what actually matters will act badly, predictably, the way someone with bad eyesight will misjudge distances. Marcus's response is not to write them off but to recognize that we are akin, made for cooperation like hands, feet, eyelids, the rows of upper and lower teeth. To turn away from them in anger is, on his view, to act against your own nature (Meditations 2.1).
Meditations 11.18 gives a longer sequence for the moment you actually feel provoked, worth having in mind when you open the news or a comment thread. Consider that people are made for one another. Consider what compulsions of opinion actually drive them. Consider that if they act rightly you have no complaint, and if they act wrongly, it is involuntary, from ignorance, since no soul willingly gives up the truth. Consider that you yourself do wrong often enough, and abstain from more faults out of cowardice or concern for reputation than out of real virtue. Consider that you rarely understand the full circumstances behind another person's act. Consider how brief a human life is. And last, the line that does the most work: it is not men's acts which disturb us, but our own opinions about those acts (Meditations 11.18). Take away the opinion that this is a catastrophe, that these people are simply enemies, and the anger goes with it.
None of this asks you to stop having political views or to stop acting on them. Voting, arguing a position, working for a cause: these are your own actions, and Epictetus places your own actions, your pursuits and aversions, squarely among the things in your control (Handbook 1). What is not in your control is how the vote goes, what other people believe, or what the news reports tomorrow. The discipline is to separate the two, so your energy goes into the action itself rather than into resentment at people who see it differently.
A concrete way to use this: before you open the news tomorrow, name in advance the kind of thing you expect to find there, the way Marcus names the busy-body and the ungrateful. Then ask, of whatever actually disturbs you, whether the disturbance is coming from the event or from your judgment about it. Usually it is the second. That does not make the event unimportant. It tells you where the actual work is.
Primary passages
Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible.
Epictetus, Handbook 5 Read in context
Epictetus's general law: the disturbance is always in the judgment, never in the bare event.
Begin the morning by saying to yourself I shall meet with the busy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil.
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.1 Read in context
Marcus prepares for the day by expecting difficult people, and diagnoses their behavior as ignorance rather than malice.
it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts have their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then ... and your anger is gone.
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 11.18 Read in context
The conclusion of Marcus's longer sequence for dealing with people who offend you.
An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on himself.
Epictetus, Handbook 5 Read in context
Epictetus's three stages: the goal is not to redirect blame but to stop needing it.
Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions.
Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context
The dichotomy of control: your political actions are up to you, the outcome and other people's opinions are not.
Important distinctions
Not caring versus not being disturbed
The Stoic claim is not that political outcomes do not matter or that you should stop caring. Epictetus's point in the Handbook is narrower: the disturbance itself comes from your judgment, not from the event. You can still act, vote, and argue for what you think is right. What changes is whether your peace of mind depends on winning.
Blaming yourself instead of others is not the goal
Epictetus's three stages in Handbook 5 are easy to misread as a call to blame yourself rather than others. The fully instructed person blames neither. The aim is not to redirect the same reflex inward but to stop needing someone to blame at all.
Objections and replies
This sounds like an excuse for passivity
If the people causing harm are just ignorant, and the real problem is my own judgment, doesn't this let bad actors off the hook and discourage me from resisting them?
Marcus does not stop at diagnosis. He still holds that people who act wrongly do so involuntarily, but he never says this means letting wrong acts go unaddressed. The dichotomy of control in the Handbook places your own pursuits and aversions, meaning your actions, squarely in your control. Acting to correct or oppose what you judge wrong is available to you. What is not available is controlling whether you succeed or whether others agree, and it is disturbance over that second thing the Stoics are targeting.
Treating opponents as ignorant rather than malicious can feel condescending
Calling people who disagree with you ignorant of good and evil, as Marcus does, can sound like a way of dismissing them rather than engaging with them.
Marcus applies the same diagnosis to himself in Meditations 11.18, noting that he too does many things wrong and abstains from others more out of cowardice or concern for reputation than real virtue. The point is not superiority. It is that everyone, including you, acts on judgments that can be mistaken, which is a reason for patience rather than contempt.
Practice this in Stoa
Guided courses in the Stoa app that put this into daily practice.
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Sources
- Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations Primary text, Stoa library